
# FINAL Marine Forces Reserve Historic Resources Survey Marine Corps Reserve Center Wilmington, NC



Prepared for:

Department of the Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command Engineering Field Division South 2155 Eagle Drive North Charleston, SC

Prepared by:

HHM Inc. Austin, TX Contract N62467-01-D-0430 Delivery Order 0014



#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAV

SOUTHERN DIVISION NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND P.O. BOX 190010 2155 EAGLE DRIVE NORTH CHARLESTON, S.C. 29419-9010

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Due 12/10

Dr. Jeffrey J. Crow State Historic Preservation Officer S Division of Archives & History 4610 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-4610

Subi: CULTURAL RESOURCES SURVEY, MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTER, WILMINGTON, WITHIN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Dear Dr. Crow:

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southern Division (NAVFAC EFD SOUTH), acting as the Cultural Resources agent for the Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, contracted with the firm of Hardy, Heck, Moore, Inc., of Austin, Texas, to conduct a cultural resources survey at one of the Marine Corps Reserve facilities within your state. The project was undertaken to satisfy Section 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). This survey involved the evaluation of the architectural components of the facility as well as conducting a Phase I Archaeological Survey at the site.

Enclosed are two hard copies and one electronic copy (CD of the combined reports) of the final report of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations relative to the Marine Corps Reserve facility within your state. The Historic Resources and Phase I Archaeological Survey Reports are prepared in compliance with Section 110 of the NHPA. Please forward any comments to me at the address on the letterhead above. You can also respond by email to ronald.n.johnson@navy.mil.

Thank you for your support of the Marine Corps' cultural resources stewardship efforts.

Sincerely,

Head, Cultural Resources Branch Historic Preservation Officer

Enclosure

(1) Final Report of the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations Relative to the Marine Corps **Reserve Facility** 

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# FINAL

MARINE FORCES RESERVE

# HISTORIC RESOURCES SURVEY

# MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTER WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA

**SEPTEMBER 2004** 

Prepared for: Department of the Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command Engineering Field Division South Charleston, SC

> Prepared by: HHM Inc. Austin, TX

Contract N62467-01-D-0430 Delivery Order 0014

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The historic resources survey of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Center (MCRC), Wilmington, North Carolina, is a complete inventory and evaluation of historic resources at the facility. This report was produced under the auspices of Contract N62467-01-D-0430; Delivery Order 0014, called the Heritage Assets and Cultural Resources Survey Project, which was undertaken to coordinate the Marine Corps' efforts to identify and manage significant heritage assets and cultural resources at 21 stand-alone Marine Corps Reserve facilities in 15 states.

This individual report contains historic and architectural resources information at MCRC Wilmington. Heritage assets and archaeological resources found and recorded at MCRC Wilmington are included in separate reports. This evaluation of the built environment complies with Section 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), as amended (P.L. 89-665; 42 USC 470).

As part of the historic resources investigations, Hardy-Heck-Moore, Inc. (HHM) of Austin, Texas, evaluated the MCRC for its eligibility for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). Because it has reached 50 years of age and is recognizable to its period of significance, as well as its associations with the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company, which built many of the Liberty Ships that were critical to the US Military in World War II, MCRC Wilmington is considered eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criterion A. However, since MCRC Wilmington meets the criteria for classification as a World War II temporary building, Building 1 has been mitigated in compliance with the nationwide Programmatic Memorandum of Agreement (PMOA) covering World War II temporary building and is no longer subject to Section 106 coordination in the event that any Federally sponsored actions affect the building. The following provides a listing of major facilities at MCRC Wilmington and the recommended assessment:

Building	Name	Date	NRHP Assessment
1	Reserve Training Building	1941	Eligible
2	Combat Vehicle Building	1985	Not Eligible
4	Flagpole	1984	Not Eligible

# HISTORIC RESOURCES SURVEY

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# INTRODUCTION

In an effort to account for its heritage assets and cultural resources, the Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) funded a limited survey to identify, document, and catalogue, where appropriate, cultural resources under MARFORRES stewardship. In 2003, HHM cultural resources specialists investigated 21 MCRCs. Heritage assets were systematically recorded and encoded into a database. In addition, the study also included a survey of historic and archaeological resources at these centers, all of which are subject to provisions of the NHPA. This report provides the results and recommendations for the historic resources survey at MCRC Wilmington. Heritage assets and archaeological resources found and recorded at MCRC Wilmington are presented in separate reports.

Four of the centers in the historic resources study were previously evaluated for eligibility for the NRHP. Of the 21 centers evaluated during this project, only four had attained the 50 years of age typically required for inclusion in the NRHP. MCRC Wilmington has reached the 50-year threshold for consideration, and because of its associations with the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company, which built many of the Liberty Ships that were critical to the U.S. Military in World War II, MCRC Wilmington is considered eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria Consideration A. The information on the built environment obtained from the survey has been encoded into a database that can be updated by MARFORRES as building improvements occur or if recorded buildings are demolished.

Individuals who conducted the cultural resources survey meet *The Secretary of the Interior's Professional Qualifications Standards* (36 CFR 61) and are specially trained in the fields of history, architectural history, and archaeology.

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# **CULTURAL RESOURCE RESPONSIBILITIES**

As the primary claimant for MCRC Wilmington, MARFORRES and its subsidiary commands have obligations under Federal law and Marine Corps policy to manage cultural resources in an approved and systematic manner. The following brief abstracts provide a summary of the important Federal legislation, the Department of Defense (DOD), and Marine Corps policies on cultural resource management.

## FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

Since the 1960s, Congress has passed a series of laws that protect cultural resources and require all Federal agencies to integrate historic preservation into the overall planning and development of programs that might have an impact on the historic integrity of a particular building, site, structure, or object. This legislation not only provides for the preservation of historic and archaeological resources, but also protects sites and artifacts sacred to native peoples of the United States. While each law addresses a specific and important aspect of preservation, the NHPA (including Section 106 and Section 110) also describes the process through which properties are listed in the NRHP and are maintained to preserve their integrity.

# NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT OF 1966 AND THE NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES (16 USC § 470)

The Department of the Navy's (DON's) primary obligations to cultural resources under its stewardship stem from the enactment of the NHPA, an official Federal list of historical and cultural properties that are significant in the history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture of the United States. The most important provision of the NHPA was the establishment of the NRHP, the nation's official list of properties that are worthy of preservation. Passage of the NHPA not only established the NRHP but also designated the National Park Service (NPS), part of the U.S. Department of the Interior, as administrator of the program at the Federal level. The NHPA also authorized state historic preservation officers (SHPOs) in every state to direct and coordinate the NRHP program within their jurisdiction. In addition, Federal agencies are directed to designate Federal preservation officers to coordinate and implement preservation-related activities within their respective agencies. As a result of the NHPA, Federal agencies became active participants in national preservation efforts. The NHPA outlined policies and regulations to implement the program. Two sections of the Act, Sections 106 and 110, list the government's responsibilities to preserve historic resources. These are presented in the following pages.

#### TYPES OF PROPERTIES ELIGIBLE FOR THE NRHP

The NRHP includes a diverse collection of properties that represent virtually all aspects of the built environment. The NHPA defines four kinds of properties that can be eligible for the NRHP, and each has a very specific denotation. As stated in the NHPA, the types of resources are:

**Building**—an edifice created to shelter any form of human activity, such as a house, barn, church, hotel, or similar structure. The designation "building" may refer to a historically related complex such as a courthouse and jail or a house and barn. A building can include grand, architect-designed residences, churches, schools, or stores, as well as modest, vernacular buildings.

**Site**—location of a significant event, a prehistoric or historic occupation or activity, or a building or structure, whether standing, ruined or vanished, where the location itself maintains historical or archaeological value regardless of the value of any existing structure. A site can mark the location of a battlefield, a rock midden Native American village, or an early milling operation.

**Structure**—a work made of interdependent and interrelated parts in a definite pattern of organization. Constructed by man, it is often an engineering project that is large in scale, such as a bridge or trestle.

**Object**—a material thing of functional, aesthetic, cultural, historical, or scientific value that may be, by nature or design, movable yet related to a specific setting or environment. An object can be public art, a mode of transportation, and infrastructural features.

**District**—a grouping of buildings, sites, structures and/or objects that share a common history and/or physical traits that collectively convey a sense of time and place. A district encompasses a welldefined area that is distinct from its surroundings and whose boundaries are logically established. Typically, the majority (at least 50 percent) of the extant resources within a district must retain sufficient integrity to enhance the district's historic character and are classified as Contributing Properties. Severely altered historic or non-historic resources within a district are classified as Noncontributing elements and slightly improve, do not improve at all, or detract from the district's overall historic character.

#### NRHP CRITERIA

To be eligible for the NRHP, a property or historic district must typically be at least 50 years old, must retain integrity, and meet at least one of the following four criteria:

- **A.** Be associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.
- B. Be associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.
- **C.** Embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction; or represent the work of a master or possess high artistic values; or represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction.
- **D.** Has yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history.

#### NRHP CRITERIA CONSIDERATIONS

Exceptions to the four criteria, known as Criteria Considerations, do exist. Cemeteries, birthplaces, or graves of historical figures; properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes; buildings or structures that have been moved from their original locations; reconstructed historic buildings; properties that are primarily commemorative in nature; and other properties that have achieved significance within the past 50 years are not considered eligible for the NRHP. However, such properties will qualify if they are integral parts of districts or conform to the following criteria:

- **A.** A religious property deriving primary significance from architectural or artistic importance.
- **B.** A building or structure removed from its original location but which is significant primarily for architectural value or is the surviving structure most importantly associated with a historic person or event.
- **C.** A birthplace or grave of a historical figure of outstanding importance if there is no other appropriate site or building directly associated with his or her productive life.

- **D.** A cemetery that derives its primary significance from graves of persons of transcendent importance, from distinctive design features, or from association with historic events.
- **E.** A reconstructed building when accurately executed in suitable environment and presented in a dignified manner as part of a restoration master plan, and when no other building or structure with the same association has survived.
- **F.** A property primarily commemorative in intent of design, age, tradition, or symbolic value that has invested it with its own historical significance.
- **G.** A property achieving significance within the past 50 years if it is of exceptional importance.

Properties in the NRHP can be listed at the national, state, or local level of significance and can be honored individually or as part of a historic district. The vast majority of properties included in the NRHP are listed at the local level of significance. In addition, most are honored for their architectural merits (NRHP Criterion C), although some are considered noteworthy for their historical associations (NRHP Criteria A and B) or for their potential to enhance our understanding of the past (NRHP Criterion D).

#### THE SEVEN ASPECTS OF INTEGRITY

To be eligible for listing in the NRHP, a property must maintain its integrity. The Secretary of the Interior defines integrity as "the ability of a property to convey its significance," and lists the following Seven Aspects of Integrity as effective guides for its assessment:

*Location*—the place where the historic property was constructed or the place where the historic event occurred.

*Design*—the combination of elements that create the form, plan, space, structure, and style of a property.

Setting-the physical environment of a historic property.

*Materials*—the physical elements that were combined or deposited during a particular period of time and in a particular pattern or configuration to form a historic property.

*Workmanship*—the physical evidence of the crafts of a particular culture or people during any given period in history or prehistory.

*Feeling*—the property's expression of the aesthetic or historic sense of a particular period of time.

Association—the direct link between an important historic event or person and a historic property.

The Seven Aspects of Integrity are based primarily on the physical attributes of a historic resource; however, the NHPA also allows for historically significant properties to be eligible for the NRHP under Criterion A, B, or D. These properties need not retain their integrity to as high a degree as a property that is significant for its architectural or engineering merits (Criterion C), but they should retain sufficient physical integrity and appear much as they did when they achieved significance.

## SECTION 110 OF THE NHPA

Section 110 mandates proactive standards for managing cultural resources, and its guidelines assist the Federal agency head and his/her personnel in carrying out their responsibilities and management of cultural resources in a manner consistent with the NHPA, related to statutory authorities and existing regulations and guidance. It requires the identification, evaluation, registration, and protection of all cultural resources, including historic, archaeological, architectural, engineering, and objects of cultural significance. Section 110 not only requires identification, but also the management of the resources. MARFORRES's responsibilities under Section 110 include:

- Prior to acquiring, constructing, or leasing buildings, installation commanders must use available historic properties to the maximum extent feasible.
- Establishing a historic preservation program to identify, evaluate, and nominate historic properties to the NRHP in consultation with SHPO, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), local governments, Federally recognized Indian Tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations, and other interested parties.
- Documenting historic properties that will be altered or destroyed as a result of a MARFORRES action. Such actions must be reviewed in accordance with NHPA Section 106.
- Ensuring that the significant historic values of the property are appropriately preserved during the transfer of historic properties.
- MARFORRES must document decisions to proceed with Federal undertakings that adversely affect historic properties when the installation commander has been unable to reach agreement through execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or Programmatic Agreement (PA) with ACHP and SHPO. Procedures for installation

commanders to follow when such a situation arises in the context of an NHPA undertaking can be found in Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 5090.1B and Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4000.35A.

#### SECTION 106 OF THE NHPA

Section 106 requires Federal agencies to consider the impact of their actions on significant historic properties and to implement mitigative procedures to offset the effects of such projects. As stated in Section 106, the head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any state and the head of any Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in, or eligible for inclusion in, the NRHP.

# NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 (NEPA) (42 USC 4321, ET SEQ.; P.L. 91-190; 40 CFR 1500-1508)

NEPA states that "...to the fullest extent possible...all agencies of the Federal Government shall...insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities; and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and technical considerations." It sets goals and provides means for carrying out environmental policy, requires public participation in the planning process, and requires consultation with agencies or technical experts who have participated in the project planning process and have provided significant information and recommendations. The NEPA also requires the preparation of a detailed statement on the environmental impact of major Federal actions that significantly affect the environment to ensure that environmental information is available to citizens before decisions are made and major Federal actions are taken.

# ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT OF 1974 (AHPA)(16 USC 469- 469C; P.L. 86-523)

The AHPA provides for the preservation of historical and archaeological data that might otherwise be irreparably lost or destroyed as a result of flooding, the building of access roads, the erection of workmen's communities, the relocation of railroads and highways, and any alteration of the terrain caused by Federal construction projects or federally funded licensed activities or programs. The Act also requires Federal agencies to notify the Secretary of the Interior of any dam construction. Furthermore, the AHPA stipulates that if archaeological resources are found, the agency must provide for their recovery or salvage. The law applies to any agency whenever it receives information that a direct or federally assisted activity could cause irreparable harm to prehistoric, historic, or archaeological resources.

# AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1978 (AIRFA)(42 USC 1996, ET SEQ.; P.L. 95-341; 43 CFR 7)

The AIRFA states that it is the responsibility of the U.S. government to protect and preserve American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians' freedom of religion. These rights include, but are not limited to, access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremony and traditional rites. Furthermore, the AIRFA ensures that tribal values are taken into account by requiring Federal agencies to allow tribes to establish their own culturally specific criteria of significance.

# ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES PROTECTION ACT OF 1979 (ARPA) (16 USC 470AA- 470LL; P.L. 96-95; 43 CFR 7; 36 CFR 79)

The ARPA preserves and protects resources and sites on Federal and American Indian lands by prohibiting the removal, sale, receipt, or interstate transportation of archaeological resources obtained illegally (i.e., without permits) from public or American Indian lands. Protected resources include historical and cultural properties and any material remains of past human life or activities that are of archaeological interest. The Act fosters cooperation between governmental authorities, professionals, and the public. It also authorizes Federal agencies to issue permits for investigations of archaeological resources on public lands under the agency's control and provides the procedures for doing so. Permits are required to excavate and remove cultural remains covered by ARPA. The purpose of the ARPA permit process is to ensure that individuals and organizations wishing to work with Federal resources have the necessary professional qualifications, and Federal standards and guidelines for research and curation are followed. The process allows SHPO to review and comment on ARPA permit applications. The ARPA permit replaces the permit required by the Antiquities Act of 1906.

# NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION ACT OF 1990 (NAGPRA) (25 USC 3001-13; P.L. 101-601)

NAGPRA provides for the protection of Native American and Native Hawaiian cultural items and establishes a process for the removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony from sites located on lands owned or controlled by the Federal government. NAGPRA also explains the transfer of ownership of cultural items to Native American or Native Hawaiian individuals (e.g., direct lineal or cultural descendants), organizations, or tribes. It addresses the recovery, treatment, and repatriation of Native American and Native Hawaiian cultural items by Federal agencies and museums. In accordance with Section 3(c) (25 USC 3002), Federal agencies should not

claim ownership or permanent control of specified cultural items discovered on Federal or Tribal lands after 16 November 1990 in the following instances:

- When lineal descendants who claim human remains and associated funerary objects are identified.
- When the Native American tribe or Native Hawaiian organization with the closest affiliation presents the strongest claim.
- When the tribe or organization that aboriginally occupied the territory presents the strongest claim. NAGPRA distinguishes between pre- and post-enactment (16 November 1990).

The Act contains data gathering, reporting, consultation, and permitting guidelines. The emphasis of NAGPRA is on consultation with Native American tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations to ensure that these guidelines play a major role in the treatment of specific cultural objects.

### DOD, DON, AND MARINE CORPS POLICIES

# DOD INSTRUCTION (DODINST) 4715.3: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM

DODINST Instructions 4715.3 provides guidance for implementing policy, assigning responsibilities, and prescribing procedures under DOD Directive 4715.1 for the integrated management of natural and historic resources on property under DOD control. The instructions assert that DOD facilities shall "plan, program, and budget to achieve, monitor, and maintain compliance with all applicable Executive orders and Federal natural and cultural resources statutory and regulatory requirements, and State regulations."

#### OPNAVINST 5090.1B

These provide the overarching guidelines that implement policy and procedures for all aspects of environmental and natural resources management and protection for Navy activities. The instructions direct Navy activities to enhance the quality of the environment, prevent pollution, and continually comply with legislation per the requirements detailed in the instruction. All levels of command are required to implement and manage the environmental and natural resources program in accordance with this instruction without need for further implementing instructions unless specifically directed. Each of the 27 chapters in this instruction addresses a separate topic of environmental and natural resources management, and details the associated scope, legislation, definitions, requirements, Navy policy, and responsibilities. Specifically, Chapter 23 addresses historic resources management responsibilities. While this applies to the Marine Corps at the facilities where it is colocated with the Navy, it does not apply to stand-alone Marine Corps Activities.

# SECNAVINST 4000.35A: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CULTURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM

These instructions establish policy and assign responsibilities with the Department of the Navy (DON) for fulfilling the requirements of the above-listed legislation, policies, and instructions. These instructions can be found online at: http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/4000\_35a.pdf.

# MARINE CORPS ORDER 5090.2A: MARINE CORPS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL

While some Marine Corps responsibilities continue to be closely linked to the Navy's policies, the Marine Corps does have its own orders to follow for environmental (and historical/archaeological) compliance matters. These instructions establish policy; reiterate the primacy of more stringent Federal, state, and local laws; and outline responsibilities within the chain found online of command. This manual can be at https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Policy/Marine/5090.2A/contents.h tml.

# BACKGROUND FOR NRHP EVALUATIONS OF MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTERS

In order to evaluate the buildings at MCRC Wilmington, the Center needs to be placed in an historical framework to help evaluate its relative significance in the Marine Corps Reserves' building program and history. A summary of the Marine Corps Reserves Facility Program follows, along with an outline of property types commonly found at MARFORRES sites.

# EARLY HISTORY OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE (1892-1919)

#### MARINES AND THE NAVAL MILITIAS

Although the Marine Corps can trace its origin to the establishment of the Continental Marines during the American Revolution in 1775, the emergence of a Reserve force did not occur until the late nineteenth century. While not specifically referred to as Reserves, the formation of Marine units was directly associated with the establishment of state Naval Militias in 1892, which effectively served as precursors to a national Reserve force. Individual states bordering the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes formed Naval Militias in an effort to protect coastlines. As a result, Marine detachments served under individual Naval Militias and remained in this capacity for the next 30 years. Examples of individual Marine units included the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Corps Reserve Company, which served with the New York State Naval Militia (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966a, 2).

Naval Militias, however, proved ineffective as state laws and local customs prevented a unified and consistent line of defense. Throughout the early twentieth century, the Department of the Navy expressed an interest in forming a national Naval Reserve to replace the state Naval Militias. Finally, in 1914, Congress passed the Naval Militia Act, which gave the Navy complete control over Naval Militias across the country. In coordination with the act, the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General George Barnett, worked together to strengthen the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves. Both men agreed on the necessity and merits of a Reserve force, especially given the recent emergence of war in Europe. The joint efforts of Daniels and Barnett soon prompted Congress into action.

#### **ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE, 1916**

On 3 March 1915, Congress created a Naval Reserve, in large part due to Secretary Daniel's lobbying. The same year, Commandant Barnett strongly recommended in the Annual Report for the Marine Corps that Congress pass a similar Reserve act for the Marines. Legislation supporting the formation of a Marine Corps Reserve finally arrived on 29 August 1916 as part of an appropriations act for the Navy. Two days later, the Navy issued General Order No. 231, a portion of which read:

A U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, to be a constituent part of the Marine Corps and in addition to the authorized strength thereof, is hereby established under the same provisions in all respects (except as may be necessary to adapt the said provisions to the Marine Corps) as those providing for the Naval Reserve Force (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 4).

The new Marine Corps Reserve was to be designed according to the Naval Reserve and included five classes of personnel: Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve A, Marine Corps Reserve B, Volunteer Marine Reserve, and the Marine Corps Flying Corps. The two Reserve groups in Brooklyn, New York, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, became the first units formed after the creation of the Reserve in 1916.

#### MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND WORLD WAR I

The newly established Marine Corps Reserve faced its first large-scale test only months later when the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. At the time of the declaration of war, the Marine Corps Reserve's active forces included three officers and 32 enlisted personnel. Soon after, however, recruitment efforts and the rapid expansion of a national Reserve infrastructure greatly enlarged the size of the Reserve. During the course of the war, Reserves made up only 10 percent of the Regular forces; however, a much larger ratio of Reserves fought on the battlefield. At war's end, the number of active Marine Corps Reserves jumped to 7,000 personnel (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966a, 3-4).

Reserves serving in Marine Corps divisions took part in many of the important military engagements in 1918, including the Aisne-Marne and Meuse-Argonne offensives. The number of casualties among Marines in the war totaled 356 officers and 11,612 enlisted personnel. The contributions of Marine Corps Reserve forces in World War I convinced many military officials of the strategic importance of maintaining an active Reserve force. Such support, however, declined rapidly in the years immediately following the end of the war.

### MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND THE INTERWAR YEARS (1919-41)

#### **POSTWAR DECLINE OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE (1919-25)**

Although victory in Europe resulted in high spirits in the months following the Armistice, by 1919 the public, Congress, and soldiers eagerly returned to peacetime pursuits. Reservists interested in maintaining ties to the Marine Corps found many barriers to continuing their service during peacetime. Poor

communication between the Marine Corps and the Reserve, as well as poor infrastructure, contributed to a greatly weakened postwar Reserve. The headquarters for the Marine Corps was not responsible for Reserve issues, and as a result, no national planning guidelines existed in the immediate postwar period. In addition, military planners were unsure of the role Reserves would play in peacetime, as well as whether the public would support continued funding for Reserve activities (Vertical File Collection, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center).

From 1920 to 1923, the Marine Corps Reserve lost officers and enlisted personnel, a trend that persuaded Commandant John A. Lejeune to pursue a stronger and more independent Reserve force. Lejeune's efforts, as well as those of World War I veterans eager to serve in the Reserve, saw tangible results in 1925, when Congress passed a Reserve Act.

### MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND THE ACT OF 1925

The Act of 1925 effectively abolished the Marine Corps Reserve established in 1916 and provided a much more stable and defined Reserve structure. The most important change occurred in the formation of two primary classes of Reserves: the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR), and the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve (VMCR). The FMCR, which would later serve as the model for the Organized Reserve, required Reservists to attend weekly drills and formed the primary core of units ready for any wartime activities. The VMCR included volunteers interested in maintaining ties to the Marine Corps; such a model served as the forerunner of the Volunteer Reserve. Reservists in the VMCR were only required to train annually. The 1925 act also clarified and established guidelines for the Reserve, enabling it to serve more independently and efficiently.

Reserve affairs were administered according to four geographic regions: Eastern Reserve Area, Southern Reserve Area, Central Reserve Area, and Western Reserve Area. Each region was made up of individual FMCR and VMCR companies, which were overseen by the area's Regular officer in charge of recruiting. Another key component of the 1925 act was the establishment of an independent Reserve agency within the Office of the Commandant. The new agency greatly enhanced Marine Corps Reserve policy formation as well as communication between the Regular and Reserve forces.

Marine Corps Commandant Lejeune, a longtime supporter of a Marine Corps Reserve, defined the mission of the new Reserve in his 1926 annual report:

...a trained force of officers and men available to serve as reinforcements to the Regular Marine Corps in time of War or national emergency. To make it possible to carry out this mission, it is absolutely necessary that

there be in the Marine Corps prior to the emergency an adequate and well trained Reserve [U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 26].

Soon after the passage of the 1925 act, Reserve units slowly began to form across the country. By 1929, the Reserve included 9,564 members. Low pay and minimum national recruiting efforts hindered the growth of the Reserve during the 1920s and 1930s. During this period, recruiting was managed by local unit commanders rather than recruiting offices. In addition, units were responsible for the majority of their required equipment and clothing, resulting in a small but dedicated cadre of Marine Corps Reserves (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966a, 9-10). Training facilities for the Reserve varied greatly, with the majority serving only the bare necessities of each unit. In states where Naval Militias had been formed, armories designed specifically for training purposes housed the units. Most units, however, occupied armories in "condemned schools, the garrets of old office buildings, storage rooms in post-office buildings, the basement in a city hall, an old court-house building, and in one case, the old hulk of a merchant ship constructed during the World War" (Upshur 1939, 488). In some instances, local communities provided property and funds for the purchase of an armory. Nevertheless, the general lack of adequate facilities for training purposes was indicative of the lack of funds provided for the Marine Corps Reserve.

## MARINE CORPS AND THE NAVAL RESERVE ACT OF 1938

Despite the hardships associated with meager funding and the national economic depression in the 1930s, the Marine Corps Reserve slowly expanded. One source of the Reserve's success during this period was the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association (MCROA), established in 1926. The MCROA, led by Congressman Melvin J. Maas, was especially effective in promoting Marine Corps Reserve issues to Congress. One such lobbying effort was for increased funding of Marine Corps Reserve training, which Congress eventually passed due to MCROA's work.

The MCROA's greatest lobbying achievement was the Naval Reserve Act of 1938, which, more than any legislation, served as the basis for the Marine Corps Reserve's overall effectiveness in World War II. The act reestablished the Reserve and organized it according to the Naval Reserve structure. The new organization included the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve, and the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve. It also increased Reservist pay, benefits and retirement, all of which would greatly aid recruiting efforts in the coming years. In addition, the act established the Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board, which served as the central agency for Reserve policy formation as well as an advisory liaison between the Navy and the Marine Corps. The substantive changes in the Reserve structure came at an opportune time; events in Europe had prompted many military and political officials to address military shortcomings in preparation for a possible war. By 1939, the restructured

Marine Corps Reserve included 14,778 personnel. Because of the sacrifice and hard work of many Reservists during the 1930s, the Marine Corps Reserve was well positioned to manage the coming challenges of World War II. As a result, the Reserve exceeded expectations during the war and fulfilled its primary mission—to reinforce the Marine Corps during wartime.

# MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND WORLD WAR II (1941-45)

After the European powers declared war in 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt accelerated the nation's wartime footing by increasing military spending and emphasizing military preparedness. In November 1940, Roosevelt called all 23 Marine Organized Reserve battalions to emergency active duty. The size of the Marine Corps remained relatively small until the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Recruitment grew enormously after Pearl Harbor, eventually resulting in the formation of six full-strength divisions serving in the Pacific theater. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Divisions were organized prior to the war and included many Reservists. In August 1942, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division led the first American offensive against Japanese forces at Guadalcanal.

Throughout the war, Marine Reservists served alongside Regular Marine forces in the largest engagements of the war, including Tarawa, Saipan, Bougainville, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. In 1943, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division, composed primarily of Reserve forces, fought in several key battles. Overall, the Marine Corps Reserve comprised 68 percent of the total Marine Corps fighting forces during World War II. The seemingly effortless inclusion of Reserve forces into the Marine Corps testified to the strength of the prewar Reserve and the guidance of its leaders. A common observation among commanders during the war was how Reserve forces were indistinguishable from Regular forces. Such observations only confirmed the value and success of the Marine Corps Reserve program. In 1946, the commandant of the Marine Corps addressed the contributions of the Reserves in World War II:

During World War II, Marine Reserves constituting the bulk of the Marine Corps had a major share in its wartime achievements. Unfailingly they demonstrated that esprit de corps which is the heritage of all Marines ["Resume of pre-war activities of MCR," 1949, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center].

After overcoming the challenges of the war, the Reserve faced an uncertain postwar climate in 1945. A peacetime economy, a more complex and technological military, and the rising threat of Communism would all present challenges to the Marine Corps Reserve following the war.

# MARINE CORPS RESERVE IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD (1946-50)

## PLANNING AND STRUCTURING A POSTWAR RESERVE (1946-48)

Following World War II, Navy and Marine Corps planners aggressively pursued policies supporting an active and strengthened reserve fighting force. Marine Corps officials proudly pointed to the reserve's vital contribution during the war, in which the majority of Marine Corps fighting forces were comprised of reserve units. Eager to retain the knowledge and skill of its veterans, military planners composed plans that encouraged an active and expansive reserve force. However, with new domestic priorities and a nation eager to forget the war, congressional funding of such plans did not match the ambitious goals of the military.

Postwar Reserve planning for the Marine Corps was managed by Colonels Clark W. Thompson and Melvin J. Maas. Thompson became the director of the Marine Corps Reserves in 1943, serving until 1946. Thompson's assignment in 1943 to Reserve planning illustrated the Marine Corps' early recognition of the postwar challenges ahead. Thompson and Maas laid the groundwork for a postwar Reserve, enabling it to train and equip thousands of forces in the coming years. The guiding mission for the Reserve after World War II was described as such:

to provide a trained force of qualified commissioned, warrant, and enlisted personnel to meet requirements for the initial expansion of the Regular Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency" [U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 102].

The Marine Corps commandant at the time, General Alexander Vandegrift, echoed the Reserve mission and lent his support to its postwar success:

All activities and personnel of the Marine Corps will share in the development and support of the Marine Corps Reserve. The objective for all, both Regular and Reserve, is the attainment of a mutual and cooperative appreciation to accompany a continuous program of military efficiency [ibid.].

#### **EARLY POSTWAR MARINE CORPS RESERVE DEVELOPMENT**

The overall structure of the Marine Corps Reserve was established shortly after the war and was organized according to the Naval Reserve's structure, as the following statement from congressional testimony explains:

In general, the same laws and the same administrative instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy for guidance of the Naval Reserve program apply equally to the Marine Corps Reserve program [U.S. Congress 1949, 4444]. In March 1946, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal authorized the establishment of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve units which were to be located in naval districts across the country. Locations were chosen with the availability of existing naval facilities, state or city-owned facilities, and privately owned facilities in mind. By the end of the year, the Marine Corps had consolidated Reserve districts in the following 10 cities: Boston; New York; Philadelphia; Washington, D.C.; Charleston, S.C.; New Orleans; Chicago; Los Angeles; San Francisco; and Bremerton, Washington (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 110). Each district was headed by a Marine Corps Reserve District director who was responsible for all Reserve matters in the district, such as recruiting efforts and locating facility space for Reserve units. Each of the 10 directors reported to the director of the Marine Corps Reserve at Marine Corps Headquarters, who reported directly to the Marine Corps commandant. The 10 district directors oversaw the Organized Reserve and Volunteer Reserve units based within their region.

The Organized Reserve and the Volunteer Reserve served as the two main components of the postwar Marine Corps Reserve. The Organized Reserve represented those officers and enlisted men who were trained to support the regular divisions of the Marine Corps during a national emergency. Organized Reserve units consisted of officers and enlisted men with one commanding officer. Also linked to each unit was an inspector-instructor, who oversaw training activities for the unit. Located at training centers throughout the country, Organized Reserve units trained for two hours each week in order to meet the "highest possible state of training prior to annual field training" (U.S. Congress 1949, 4445). Every year, each unit underwent a 15-day active duty training period alongside active Marine Corps troops. This training period was the most important activity for each Reserve unit, as it provided Reserve troops with the most realistic and up-to-date drills associated with active duty.

The Volunteer Reserve consisted of "all reservists, except the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, who are not in Organized Reserve units (U.S. Congress 1949, 4446)." The Volunteer Reserve provided the Marine Corps Reserve with a reservoir of trained and semi-trained officers and enlisted men who could be used to fulfill mobilization requirements in the case of war. One of the strengths of the Volunteer Reserves was its training of officer candidates, which helped to fill the void in leadership roles. As part of the program, Volunteer Training Units (VTU) were organized to allow non-Organized Reserve officers and enlisted men the ability to maintain skills and knowledge alongside other Reservists.

By mid-1946, the Marine Corps Reserve included 50 organized ground units in the planning stage. These Organized Reserve units consisted of 16 infantry battalions, 7 howitzer battalions, 2 tank and 2 amphibian tractor units, 10 engineer and 4 signal companies, a 40 mm battery, and 2 heavy antiaircraft

artillery groups (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966a, 19). Continued expansion of the Reserves was anticipated as seen by the 1947 fiscal year authorization, which listed the Organized Reserve at 2,600 officers and 30,000 enlisted personnel, and the Volunteer Reserve numbering 21,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted personnel (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 110). By July 1949, 114 Organized Reserve units were located in 106 cities; the units were housed in 111 training centers, 57 of which were shared with the Navy (U.S. Congress, 1949: 4445).

In addition to training Marine Corps Reservists, training centers across the country established relations with the community. Many cities and towns welcomed the presence of military training centers and offered land and building leases at virtually no cost. Perhaps most representative of the Marine Corps Reserve's efforts to reach out to the community was the Toys for Tots Program. Initiated in 1947 in Los Angeles, California, the Toys for Tots Program began as a local Marine Corps Reserve effort to collect and distribute toys to disadvantaged local children during the Christmas season. Since its inception, the program has expanded to Reserve centers across the country and has been aided by numerous celebrity spokespersons including Bob Hope, John Wayne, and Doris Day. In the course of its existence, the program has distributed over 231 million toys to more than 116 million children and has greatly aided the Marine Corps Reserve in its efforts to establish healthy community relations (Marine Forces Reserve, 2003).

#### NATIONAL MILITARY RESERVE DEVELOPMENT (1946-50)

Representing the larger background to the early development of the Marine Corps Reserve was an emerging national consensus concerning the importance of a civilian Reserve component to the nation's defense needs. The inevitable downsizing of active military units immediately following World War II was hastened because of the nation's new domestic priorities, such as housing, jobs, and the peacetime economy. Peace however, presented military planners and officials with an increasingly complex international state of affairs. Unable to commit the financial resources to a large standing army, President Truman and Congress turned to the Reserves to fill the nation's emerging postwar defense needs.

In 1947, President Truman appointed Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal as the new Secretary of Defense, a position that emerged from Truman's reorganization of the executive branch following World War II. A strong advocate of the Naval Reserve while serving as the Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal served as one of the principal architects of the early postwar Reserve. One of his first acts as Secretary of Defense was the appointment of the Committee on Civilian Components, which was to provide "a comprehensive, objective, and impartial study" of the reserve components of the U.S. armed forces. Chaired by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray and subsequently referred to as the Gray Board, the committee submitted its report, titled *Reserve Forces for National Security*, in June 1948 (Galloway 1957, 465-466). The report enthusiastically supported the role of a strong Reserve force in the nation's future defense needs and recommended a uniform national policy in order to ensure preparedness and military effectiveness. Past mistakes in reserve policy were highlighted in the report to prevent future mistakes. The board recommended that proper planning and funding were essential in order to coordinate a responsive Reserve force in the event of a national emergency:

The Reserves, however, are further relied on by all of the services to produce the build-up for reinforcement, expansion and replacement during the first six to twelve months after mobilization...

Each service, within the broad plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, must determine which missions can be performed at the outbreak of war only by regular forces, which by Reserve forces operating as units and which by individual Reserve personnel. Each service must also decide which missions can be performed after the outbreak of war by its Reserve forces, and, consequently, it must plan carefully and develop the phased mobilization or timetable of these forces.

The organization and training of Reserves, both in units and individually, must be based directly upon these mobilizations schedules. Their value to the country's defense depends upon the extent and the effectiveness with which this is done. Available funds should be concentrated on the training of those units and personnel which are required immediately or soon after M-day, National security must determine how Reserve funds are spent [Department of Defense 1948].

Shortly after the submittal of the Gray Board report, planning activities associated with Reserve forces increased. On 15 October 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 10007, calling for the organization of the Reserve units of the armed forces and providing the initial framework for the postwar Reserve. In addition to establishing the importance of a civilian component to national security, the order included the following language:

The Secretary of Defense, and the head of each department in the National Military Establishment, shall proceed without delay, utilizing every practicable resource of the regular components of the armed forces, to organize all reserve component units, and to train such additional individuals now or hereafter members of the active reserve, as may be required for the national security; and to establish vigorous and progressive elements of the reserve components, including the National Guard [President 1948].

Though the Marine Corps had accomplished much of the planning associated with its postwar Reserve force before the president's executive order, it underscored the important role Reserve forces would play in the national security efforts of the postwar period.

Equally important to the development of the Reserves in the immediate postwar period was Congress. Appropriations to the active military branches faced severe reductions in the years after World War II. The rising threat of Communism from the Soviet Union, and the unstable political climate in Europe, however, argued for the maintenance of a strong U.S. military presence. Military planners continually pointed to the prewar period and the lack of military planning and preparedness that characterized the country at the start of the war. At the same time, the country faced mounting domestic challenges. Millions of returning veterans eager to return to their prewar lives were met with a massive housing shortage. In addition, the country was just beginning to shift from a war economy to a peacetime economy, with many worried about a return of conditions reminiscent of the Depression. Congress in its early appropriations activities after the war, clearly favored domestic priorities. To solve the problem of maintaining a military presence, Congress and the president realized the value of relying on Reserve forces to protect the nation, especially considering their lower operating costs.

As a result, the Marine Corps Reserve, through appropriations for the Navy, received a healthy level of funds from Congress, while the active branches faced severe cuts. The majority of funds, however, were allocated for Reserve personnel, rather than training and construction projects. Unfortunately for the Marine Corps Reserve, the lack of adequate training facilities was the largest obstacle facing its postwar development.

# MARINE CORPS RESERVES FACILITIES PROGRAM (1946-50)

The shortage of training facilities was closely related to the housing shortage faced by the nation in the immediate years following the war. Military construction after the war was a low priority considering the limited building materials available; domestic housing instead served as the dominant focus in the postwar years. Contributing to the shortage was the lack of Reserve facility construction prior to the war. Military planners, including those in the Marine Corps, recognized early on the lack of training facilities and how it would affect their ambitious plans for Reserve forces. Administrators of the Marine Corps Reserve Program commented on the shortage in the September 1946 *Reserve Bulletin*:

Should any reservist know of a facility available and satisfactory for a Reserve armory and located in a city which could support a Reserve unit, it is requested that such information be forwarded to the Director, Division of Reserve [U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 108].

# MARINE CORPS RESERVE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION

To manage the shortage of facilities, the Marine Corps Reserve heavily relied on the Marine Corps Reserve Officers' Association (MCROA). Established in 1926, MCROA shifted from a wartime focus to efforts that promoted the Marine Corps Reserve in the postwar period, particularly Congressional lobbying. Led by Colonel Melvin Maas, who with Clark Thompson helped plan the postwar Marine Corps Reserve structure, MCROA played an integral role in attaining Congressional appropriations for the Reserve, as well as repeatedly voicing its mission to members of Congress. For his role in promoting Reserve issues, Maas was frequently referred to by colleagues as "Mr. Reserve." A former U.S. Congressman from Minnesota, Maas was especially effective in Congressional hearings. In a 1949 hearing before the House Committee on Armed Services, Colonel Maas reiterated the importance of facility construction to the organizational health of the Marine Corps Reserve:

If we are going to have a Reserve, we have simply got to have the facilities to make it possible to train the men. The defense of this country can never rest upon the professional military service alone, and it is unfair to place the burden on the Regulars of being dependent upon a large civilian reserve and not give the Regulars the facilities with which to train the civilian components, the Reserves.

It is unfair to ask the youth of this country to prepare themselves for the defense of this country and not give them adequate facilities with which to do it. And, in many cases, you will have to provide the facilities before the organizations of the various components can be completely organized. You cannot organize a regiment or a battalion or even a company and have it functioning before you build the armory. They have got to have facilities; they have to have equipment; there must be a place to put that equipment; some place to call them together and drill...

Now, if we provide the facilities and build up our Reserves, that will put the world on notice that this country is capable and has the will to retaliate if it is struck, and we may very well avoid a war. Certainly that will give us the best chance to avoid it [U.S. Congress 1949, 4511-12].

### NAVY AND MARINE CORPS RESERVE TEMPORARY FACILITY CONSTRUCTION

Maas' convincing testimony, as well as other Marine Corps and Navy personnel during this period, helped both institutions provide adequate facilities for its growing Reserve forces. In addition, civilian and military support of Reserves increased, especially after the release of the Gray Board Report in 1948. One of the recommendations of the report called for adequate funding of training facilities for Reserve forces. Rather than fund permanent training facilities, which the Navy and Marine Corps desired, however, Congress, in separate appropriation funds in 1947, 1948, and 1949, authorized the Navy to use "surplus

40 by 100 foot Stran-Steel buildings," or hut-type buildings (ibid., 4471). These hut-type buildings were temporary structures, primarily Quonset-type huts and Butler buildings, which the Navy had in surplus following the war. In addition to the Quonset huts, the Navy and Marine Corps pursued other arrangements such as the "purchasing, leasing, and rehabilitation of existing buildings and property" (Department of Defense 1955, 2564).

In numerous cases, Marine Corps reserve units were placed within joint armory facilities operated by the Navy. In these cases, Marine and Navy units shared training space in order to maximize facility construction budgets. By 1949, Marine Corps Reserve units trained at a total of 111 centers, 57 of which were joint use with the Navy. Some of the locations of the new Marine Corps ground reserve units included Atlanta, Birmingham, Boston, Chicago, Seattle, St. Paul, and Philadelphia. Overall, the Marine Corps spent \$4 million between 1946 and 1950 for the construction of reserve training facilities (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 105). The Marine Corps Commandant summarized the facility construction climate in the years immediately following World War II:

Armories are being provided by rentals, surplus property, and through state-owned properties. While this situation is still far from satisfactory, we are in much better condition than prior to the war. This is a problem that will always be with us until Congress provides Federally-owned armories. When this will be done—well, your guess is as good as mine [Annual Report of the Commandant 1929-1948, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center].

### NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT MUNITIONS BOARD

Despite the progress made by the Navy and Marine Corps in attaining facilities for its Reserves, the issue was a major concern for the military as a whole. The Army and Air Force in particular faced acute shortages of training facilities for their Reserves; in Congressional hearings between 1946 and 1950, Congressmen and military officials regularly praised the efforts of the Navy and Marine Corps in establishing their Reserves and training facilities. Much of the discrepancy could be attributed to the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves' longer history. Nevertheless, the lack of Reserve facilities played a large role in the creation of the Gray Board, as well as President Truman's executive order calling for the organization of Reserve units in 1948.

The recommendations included in the Gray Board's report as well as Truman's executive order, no doubt influenced Secretary of Defense Forrestal's establishment in October 1948 of the National Military Establishment Munitions Board. Represented by all three armed service branches, the Munitions Board created a Committee on Facilities and Services to address the problem of

attaining and building Reserve training centers to house the expanding postwar Reserve forces. A subcommittee appointed by the Committee on Facilities and Services and made up of Navy, Army, and Air Force representatives, was tasked specifically to pursue the following agenda:

- Coordinate the requirements of the three Reserve departments
- Perform surveys of existing facilities and recommend potential expansion, and joint use
- Recommend a long-range construction program
- Standardize construction policies
- Coordinate and oversee the facilities budget of all three departments (HHM Inc. 1995, 34)

After reviewing numerous documents and reports, the Committee on Facilities and Services devised the creation of National Defense Reserve Facilities Boards in each state. The boards consisted of a state representative from each of the three military departments and were tasked with creating surveys of all Federal and state-owned facilities within the state. The boards were also responsible for recommending joint-use arrangements among the available facilities, as well as providing long-range construction recommendations and expansion needs. All surveys and recommendations by the state boards were passed on to the Committee on Facilities and Services, who then prepared an overall priority list of construction and expansion projects throughout the country based on need. Such a system allowed the military to present a unified and cost-effective request to Congress for Reserve facility funding. Nevertheless, the overall military effort of encouraging joint construction projects among the three branches was slow to take effect, aside from the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve, who by 1950, were sharing 55 facilities (ibid., 35-36).

### NATIONAL DEFENSE FACILITIES ACT, 1950

By 1950, the Marine Corps was providing adequate, yet temporary facility training space for its 40,000 Reserves. Despite this success, military officials recognized the danger of relying on temporary facilities given the long term need for Reserve training. Numerous Marine Corps officials offered testimony in favor of increased construction funds for facilities across the United States. Major General Stephen G. Olmstead, the deputy chief of staff for Marine Corps Reserve Affairs, testified before the Armed Services Committee and accentuated the Marine Corps' need for adequate training facilities:

An integral part of the Reserve modernization and enhancement effort consists of improving the facilities used by our reservists. With 302 SMCR units situated in 180 separate locations, the condition of many aging Reserve Training Centers is a distinct matter of concern. To maintain acceptable training and habitability standards for our reservists, we need to replace or renovate facilities at almost 80 locations, some of these having been built to temporary standards during World War II [Olmstead 1951, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center].

The lack of adequate Reserve facilities for all military branches eventually prompted Congress to address the problem. In 1949, Congress debated a bill that would fund the construction of new facilities and ease the acquisition of buildings for training purposes. In 1950, Congress passed the National Defense Facilities Act, which provided for the "purchase, lease, or transfer, construction, expansion, rehabilitation, conversion, operation, and maintenance" of training facilities (U.S. Congress 1950, 6389). The Act placed limits on the amount of money that could be spent in a fiscal year. As a result, the Navy and Marine Corps made use of five-year plans, which prioritized Reserve facility construction projects according to importance of the Reserve unit, and the condition of the training environment. While the legislation was a significant step forward in securing adequate training facilities for the armed services, appropriations from the act did not occur until 1954, four years after its passage. Events in Korea prevented the release of funds for facility construction. Instead, the Marine Corps Reserve faced its first wartime challenge since World War II.

### MARINE CORPS RESERVES AND THE KOREAN WAR (1950-53)

The resolute dedication of Marine Corps officials to the establishment of a postwar Reserve structure proved most beneficial with the United States facing an international crisis in the summer of 1950. As a result of the North Korean army's invasion of the Republic of Korea, the United Nations called for a coalition army of member nations to counter the North Koreans. At the time, the U.S. Marine Corps' active forces did not include an active war-strength division for use in Korea. Just as Marine Corps Reserve planners had envisioned, Reserve units were needed to complete active divisions necessary for wartime maneuvers.

Before hostilities, the Marine Corps Reserve included the Organized Reserve with 33,528 men divided into 138 units, and the Volunteer Reserve with 88,000 men. In early July, General Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. commander of the Far East, requested a full-strength Marine Corps division for deployment to Korea. To meet the need, Congress and the president activated Reserve forces to aid in the Korean military buildup on 19 July 1950 (Stickney 1952, 6-7, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center).

As a result, units of the Organized Reserve underwent a rapid transformation from Reserve to active units, a process that included training at camps Lejeune and Pendleton. Organized Reserve troops reported for active duty on 11 September 1950, a transition that totaled only 53 days; the short period testified to the thorough planning efforts and dedication of the Marine Corps Reserve in the immediate postwar years. A few days after their arrival in Korea, Marine Corps Reserve troops played a crucial role in the Inchon invasion, which allowed UN forces to establish a beachhead in formerly Communist-

controlled Korea (Giusti 1967, 8). In the ensuing months, the Volunteer Reserves were activated, resulting in a continuous rotation of Reserve forces throughout the conflict. By March 1951, approximately 48 percent of the Marine Corps forces in Korea were Reservists, the high number testifying to its important role (ibid., 1).

Overall, the efforts of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean War established a model for Reserve units in future wars. The quick use of Reserve forces ably demonstrated to military and congressional officials, many of whom served as impediments to the formation of a postwar Reserve, the viability and importance of a Reserve program. Despite great resistance from some members of Congress and the military, the Marine Corps managed to create a strong, decisive wartime Reserve force in the immediate postwar period, as was proved during the Korean War.

Many of the Reservists serving in Korea were former World War II combat veterans, and their knowledge and experience proved invaluable to the war effort. Nevertheless, the war exposed some flaws in the Reserve program, namely the continued use of World War II combat veterans, many of whom resented the fact that less experienced civilians were not expected to fight. As a result, Congress addressed Reserve issues related to the Korean War in 1952.

### **ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT OF 1952**

On July 9, 1952, Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act. While the act simply codified previous statutes already in effect, it did provide an organizational structure for Reserve forces. Seven different Reserve components, including the Marine Corps Reserve, National Guard, Coast Guard Reserve, and the Army Reserve, made up the entire Reserve forces for the armed forces. The overall strength of the Reserve was limited to 1.5 million personnel. The actions of the Reserve in Korea played a large role in shaping legislation (Galloway 1957, 473).

The act ranked the Reserve according to levels of mobilization priority and included the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The following list explains the variations for each classification.

- Ready Reserve Consisted of units liable for a 24-month, involuntary call during a time of war or national emergency
- Standby Reserve Consisted of units liable for active duty only during act of war or national emergency
- Retired Reserve Included members whose names had been placed on the Reserve Retired list subject to certain conditions (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve 1966b, 181)

The act also provided for a Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board to advise the Secretary of the Navy on Reserve matters related to the Marine Corps. Half of the board was comprised of Marine Reservists. In subsequent years, the Armed Forces Reserve Act was modified, including in 1955 when training for Reserves was increased to six months a year. The change in training time played a large role in improving the overall skills of Reservists. Despite this and other alterations to the original Act, it remained the defining legislation for the postwar Reserve.

# THE COLD WAR AND THE MARINE CORPS RESERVES FACILITIES PROGRAM (1950-59)

Despite the efficient and successful use of Marine Reservists in the Korean War, public and political support for military spending in the early 1950s was relatively low. Domestic concerns continued to occupy the minds of the public, while Congress and the president pursued policies emphasizing fiscal restraint. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson echoed this view and advised President Truman of the importance of balancing the budget. As a result, the 1951 defense budget was \$7 billion less than the armed forces had requested. Nevertheless, Major General Edward Craig, the director of the Marine Corps Reserve in 1951, provided a statement to Congress in which he requested the construction or leasing of 53 new Reserve training centers in the coming years. Unfortunately for the Marine Corps, such a request fell on deaf ears, especially given the relative good health of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve programs as compared to those of the Army and Air Force (Craig 1951, Marine Corps Historical Center). Congressmen at this time were only interested in maintaining a basic level of infrastructure for Reserve programs.

With the Korean War occupying military budgets during the early 1950s, no appropriations for naval construction occurred until 1954. As a result, the Marine Corps focused funds it received during these years on increasing personnel enrollment. After the signing of the armistice in Korea, however, the Marines returned their attention to the construction of reserve facilities, some of which were already in need of maintenance and replacement due to their temporary construction. Navy and Marine Corps planners intended to replace the initial postwar temporary construction program with permanent reserve training centers.

Unfortunately, Congressional leaders were still wary of additional military spending and encouraged the continued joint use of facilities. In late 1953, however, the Marine Corps was successful in receiving funds to construct permanent additions to Naval Reserve facilities—close to 39 additions for the Marine Corps Reserve were constructed during the 1950s, at a cost of \$8 million. The additions were mostly of masonry construction. By 1955, Marine Corps Reserve units trained in 233 centers, 159 of which were additions to Naval Reserve received \$7 million from Congress to replace 54 inadequate facilities (U.S. Congress 1955, 2567).

Throughout the 1950s, Congress continued to appropriate funds for the expansion and maintenance of Marine Corps Reserve facilities. Nevertheless, military planners were forced to deal with a Congress eager to cut costs and use joint facilities as much as possible. In the following exchange from a 1955 hearing, Senator Arthur V. Watkins asked the Secretary of Defense why the Marine Reserve construction program could not be conducted by solely relying on existing training camps and National Guard armories—in answer, the Secretary replied:

The Marine Corps does not contemplate any expansion of regular facilities to implement this plan. However, expansion of reserve facilities will be necessary because space in National Guard armories cannot be made available. Before construction or leasing of a training center is requested, an exhaustive search is made in each community to ascertain whether existing camps or armories can be utilized. All service and governmental agencies (through GSA) are consulted. Only after negative replies are received from above agencies is a request made for procurement of new facilities [Watkins 1955, NARA].

By 1957, the Marine Corps Reserve occupied 233 training facilities, 162 of which were shared with the Navy. Of the 233 facilities, 40 were federally owned properties, and 27 were commercially leased. Officials with the Reserve, in order to promote new construction, argued that significant savings would result in the direct ownership of facilities, as opposed to rental arrangements, which could be altered or canceled arbitrarily by private owners (U.S. Congress, 1958).

Comprised of 20,865 officers and 272,166 enlisted men in 1958, the Marine Corps Reserve received \$1,410,000 to expand and purchase new facilities for eight training centers throughout the country. Several Reserve training facilities were completed in 1958 as well, and included Miami, Florida, Durham, North Carolina, Baltimore, Maryland, Pico Rivera, California, and Wichita, Kansas. Construction during this time included additions to Naval Reserve training centers, as well as new facilities, such as the new building constructed in Baltimore. Others like Brook Park Reserve Training Center in Ohio occupied existing buildings. Like the Navy Reserve, new facility construction for the Marine Corps was mostly dependent upon local architectural firms and developers and included a variety of styles. In 1959 hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, Captain Corradi of the Navy explained the overall policy for new construction:

Our normal procedure for awarding a contract for construction of a training center such as this is to have complete plans and specifications prepared by a local architect or engineer practicing in the State in which the facility is to be constructed, and then to advertise for competitive bidding, that is for competitive bids, and to award the contract on the basis of the lowest competitive bid [U.S. Congress 1959, 1597].

Beginning in 1954, the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves began using five-year plans for planning and construction purposes. Knowing they would never receive enough appropriations from the 1950 National Defense Facilities Act to meet all of their construction needs, the Navy and Marine Corps prepared plans according to the level of need within each Naval district. As a result, the oldest facilities were usually replaced or repaired first. The use of five-year plans continued through the 1960s (HHM, Inc. 1995, 53).

While funding during this period was adequate for Marine Corps Reserve facilities, the nation's political and economic priorities slowed the more ambitious goal of separate, permanent Reserve training facilities across the country (U.S. Congress 1958, 1015). New facilities constructed during this period occurred only when all other possibilities were exhausted. One such example was the Marine Corps Reserve Training Center in Chicago, Illinois. In 1959, the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves presented an appropriation request to Congress for the construction of a new facility in Chicago. The old training center, a former school of optometry, provided no space for drills, combat maneuvers or weapon training. Also missing were a rifle range, a garage, and a vehicle maintenance shop. In addition, high annual rental and repair costs made the acquisition of a new center imperative. When asked why the existing Marine Corps Reserve unit could not relocate to an existing Army, Navy, or Air Force facility in the area, the officials responded that all possible units in the area were at full capacity. As a result, funding for the Marine Corps Reserve Training Center at Chicago was eventually passed (U.S. Congress 1959, 1595). Nevertheless, a majority of new construction during these years involved additions to existing Naval Reserve training centers. In 1959, the Marine Corps Reserve continued to share space with the Navy and other military branches, with 71 percent of their facilities being jointly used.

## VIETNAM ERA (1960-73)

#### **RESERVE POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES (1962-70)**

In 1960, the Marine Corps Reserves included 43,000 active personnel located in 316 ground and air units across the country. The Communist blockade of Berlin in 1961 resulted in the activation of Marine Corps Reserve units and was used as an example by Marine Corps officials of the importance of a modern Reserve force. In July 1962, the Marine Corps Reserve underwent a major reorganization of its structure in order to deal more effectively with international crises. The situation Berlin in 1961 provided evidence of the volatility of world affairs and highlighted the United States' needed ability to send a trained and effective military force quickly overseas. Prior to the reorganization, the Reserves were structured into three active duty divisions and air wings. The reorganization moved "group units into major elements to form a 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division and a 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division would receive 39 days a year of intensive training and equipment identical to the regular Marine forces. The new division provided the

Marine Corps Reserve with its most advanced and highly trained division available for rapid response duties. The change also modernized the Reserve forces, enabling it to keep pace with a changing world "characterized by a series of crises, by vastly speeded communications, and by rapid technological advances" (Stevens 1965, 140-143).

Beginning in 1964 and continuing through 1975, the United States entered into a conflict with Communist forces in Vietnam. From the beginning, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara decided not to use Reserve forces in Vietnam, but instead relied on the Selective Service. McNamara believed that the regular military forces were capable of handling the conflict without the use of Reserve forces. As a result, Reserves in all branches of the military suffered from a lack of funding during the war years. By 1970, the high cost of the war forced military planners to reevaluate how the military could reduce costs in the future. Pentagon officials also forecasted an increase in defense expenditures as a result of their planned use of an all-volunteer military beginning in 1972, when the military would no longer rely on the draft. To meet these future needs and to promote cost-effective solutions, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, on August 21, 1970, introduced his "Total Force Policy." The policy advocated a strong role for Reserve forces in future conflicts, a change many in the Reserves welcomed after years of inactivity during the Vietnam War:

Within the Department of Defense,...economies will require deductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and the combat support units of the Guard and Reserves.

Emphasis will be given to the concurrent consideration of the Total Forces, Active and Reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing National Guard and Reserve Forces [Duncan 2002, 2].

The new policy essentially utilized an increased integration of regular and Reserve forces that could meet future threats with increased efficiency and speed. Despite the clear need for change following the Vietnam War, few aspects of the Total Force Policy occurred in the 1970s; it was not until President Reagan entered office in 1981 that the policy was implemented into the overall military structure.

### **RESERVE FACILITY CONSTRUCTION IN THE VIETNAM ERA**

Throughout the 1960s, the Marine Corps Reserve continued the process of updating its temporary training facilities, and constructing permanent centers when possible. As a result, new facilities were more likely to be of masonry or concrete construction. Like the Navy, the Marine Corps faced a slow process of

getting construction projects approved through Congress. Unlike the temporary construction phase from 1946 to 1950 where Quonset huts and armories were quickly set up, construction in the 1950s and 1960s was a much slower process. This can partly be explained by the Navy and Marine Corps' attempts at establishing more permanent facilities, which were much more expensive than temporary buildings. These greater costs limited the amount of projects the Marine Corps could pursue, given Congress' continued wariness about military construction appropriations.

While regular forces pursued the bulk of the fighting in Vietnam, the Marine Corps Reserve continued its efforts at updating and constructing permanent training facilities, but was unable to make much progress with its construction goals. In 1965, the Marine Corps requested two new training centers in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. Additions to existing centers at Syracuse, New York, Evansville, Indiana, and Alameda, California, were also requested. Receiving appropriated funds often took years, and delayed Marine Corps officials' attempts at updating its facilities (U.S. Congress 1965).

The lean appropriations for Reserve military construction during the mid-1960s to the early 1970s was evident in language used by Navy and Marine Corps officials during Congressional testimonies. The following passage was repeatedly used verbatim during these years to describe the Reserve facility construction program:

We have no plans to increase the number of air stations or surface training facilities this year...Frugality has enabled us to acquire and use the maximum number of facilities at minimum cost. However, facilities that are of a temporary nature are deteriorating at a faster rate than they can be replaced, and a number of leases are being terminated with no opportunity of renewal. These facts, coupled with the assignment of more complex and sophisticated weapons systems have created an urgency in the requirements for modernizing our facilities if we are to continue to meet our Reserve commitments in quantity and quality...The facility requirements to be met by this year's tentative program are limited to replacement for the most critically needed air facilities and training centers for the surface and ground forces [U.S. Congress 1967, 9290-91].

Despite a growing Reserve force in the late 1960s (48,000 active Reserve personnel), the unpopularity of the Vietnam War greatly reduced popular support of the Reserves as well as Congressional funding. It was not until the mid-1970s that Reserve funding returned to its normal level.

### POST-VIETNAM ERA (1973-PRESENT)

Following the Vietnam War in 1973, the Marine Corps Reserve along with the Naval Reserve, experienced a rise in Congressional funding. Most of the funds, however, were designated for personnel purposes and not for reserve facility construction. Like the Navy, the Marine Corps found it difficult to prepare long-term plans for Reserve construction due to fluctuating Congressional funding year to year.

By 1975, Navy and Marine Corps officials classified 57 percent of its Reserve training facilities as substandard due to years of reduced Congressional funding and temporary construction materials. In a 1975 hearing before Congress, Rear Admiral Richard Altmann notified Subcommittee House members that the Navy and Marine Corps faced a backlog of Reserve facility construction totaling \$350 million. Altmann projected a backlog of \$440 million by 1981 if conditions remained the same. These millions of dollars represented the numerous additions, repairs, and acquisitions that the Navy and Marine Corps needed, but were unable to initiate over the years. The cost-effective jointuse of facilities continued in 1975, with 56 percent of Navy training centers being occupied by Marine Corps and Navy units. That same year, the Marine Corps requested 6 Reserve training center projects, 4 of which were joint-use facilities (U.S. Congress 1975, 539).

The varying influences of three presidents in the 1970s as well as diverse domestic agendas resulted in an uncertain fiscal environment for the Marine Corps Reserves. Under Presidents Ford and Carter, the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve programs faced significant budget cuts; some of the reductions were canceled due to active lobbying by military officials. Nevertheless, after Congressional negotiations regarding the size of Reserve appropriations, 63 Navy and Marine Corps Reserve activities were eliminated "to improve fleet readiness" in 1977 (Navy Times 1977). In 1978, the Marine Corps Reserve included Reserve training centers at 177 locations, 141 which were jointly occupied with the Navy or other branch and 36 which were solely occupied by the Marine Corps (Vertical File Collection, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center).

Congressional funding for the Marine Corps Reserve saw significant increases in the 1980s and was concurrent with President Reagan's efforts to expand defense spending. Reagan's tenure in office also saw the gradual integration of the regular and Reserve forces that was outlined in the Total Force Policy in 1970. In 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger instituted a policy ensuring that Reserve units deploying at the same time as regular forces would have equal access to modern equipment. Shortly after, Congress created the position of assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The new position ensured that Reserve matters would be represented in policy formation within the Department of Defense. Despite some conflict within military circles regarding the role of Reserve forces, events in 1990 provided the first test of the new Total Force Policy. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91 illustrated the modern role

of reserve forces serving in tandem with regular forces and, as a result, firmly established an increased reliance on Reserve forces in the years to come (Duncan 2002, 3).

The rise in defense funding in the 1980s, however, did not translate into a sizeable expansion of training facilities for Marine Corps Reserve activities, as much of the funds went to personnel costs. In fact, the Marine Corps and the Navy in the 1980s began a process of limiting the five-year construction programs in order to pursue cost effective solutions for training centers. One trend that developed from this shift in priorities was the acquisition of existing buildings, such as schools, for use as training centers. Rather than turn to new construction to alleviate the problems associated with its aging Reserve facilities, the Marine Corps and the Navy instead leased or purchased existing buildings and renovated them according to their needs.

The Marine Corps also benefited from a new initiative from the Navy Department. Because the Navy's Operation and Maintenance Naval Reserve Operations funds for Reserve facility construction and maintenance were limited, the Navy Department, in 1982, initiated the Whole Center Repair program. Designed to provide cost-effective solutions for Reserve facility construction and maintenance, the Whole Center Repair program continued the Marine Corps' attempts to move away from new construction and instead improve existing facilities, with a goal of extending their life by 15 to 20 years. Instituted by the Navy, the program only applied to centers where the Navy was the host. Thus, the program provided no benefits in Reserve centers occupied solely by the Marine Corps (U.S. Department of the Navy 1997, 1).

The program specifically addressed external and internal repairs, rather than new additions, or new construction. The program was designed to "eliminate identified facility deficiencies; provide energy saving features; optimize space usage; and incorporate state-of-the-art low maintenance construction materials and equipment." As a result, Reserve centers across the country underwent minor and major repairs and updates, including new electrical systems, roofs, structural repair, and exterior siding. The Whole Center Repair Program allowed the Navy and Marine Corps to maintain adequate training facilities for Reserves in a cost-effective manner (ibid.).

The process established for acquiring and managing Reserve facilities in the late 1980s was detailed in an order from the commandant of the Marine Corps in 1988. During this period, all Navy and Marine Corps Reserve construction and acquisition projects were funded by the Military Construction Naval Reserve (MCNR) appropriation. The five-year programs established earlier by the Navy were still in use and continued to guide construction goals. All Marine Corps Reserve sole-use construction projects fell under the responsibility of the Marine Corps, whereas joint-use Marine Corps/Navy projects were managed by the Navy. As part of the Marine Corps planning efforts, inspector-instructors at each reserve center were required to keep the Marine Corps Reserve Headquarters informed of the type and condition of each facility. This information was

then used for future reserve facility planning efforts (U.S. Department of the Navy 1988, 1-3).

The further development of the Joint Service Reserve Component Facility Boards (JSRCFB) in 1988 was integral to the construction planning process for the Marine Corps. The boards, based on the National Defense Reserve Facilities Board developed in the late 1940s, were established in each state and included representatives from each branch of the military. The purpose of the boards was to coordinate Reserve facility construction programs within each state in order to maximize "joint service construction/use whenever practicable." The acquisition of new Reserve facilities by the Marine Corps was coordinated in the following manner, with each step listed in priority order:

- Make full use of existing, partially used facilities of other reserve components or the active forces.
- Use of local, existing real property facilities excess to the needs of the military departments or other Federal agencies by transfer, use agreement, or permit.
- Lease or donation of privately or publicly owned facilities that meet the needs or can be modified at reasonable cost to meet the needs of the reserve unit(s).
- Construction of additions to existing reserve component and active force facilities, or construction on property controlled by them, with provision for maximum joint or common use of existing space and facilities.
- Lease or purchase existing real property facilities that meet the needs without uneconomical remodeling or renovation.
- Joint construction of a new facility by two or more reserve components or with an active force. If such construction at a single location cannot be done concurrently for some presently irreconcilable reason, the design and siting of the initial structure shall include provisions for future expansion.
- Unilateral construction of a new facility by one reserve component only when supported by a JSRCFB recommendation that has carefully reviewed all other acquisition methods and found them impracticable or uneconomical (ibid., 1-6, 1-7).

These seven steps reveal the course taken by the Marine Corps to avoid unnecessary expenses related to the reserve facility construction. New centers were built only as a last resort, and had to be approved by the commandant of the Marine Corps. Such costcutting attempts reflected decreased funding for Reserve facility construction, which accelerated after Reagan left office in 1988.

The 1990s proved to be a decade of contraction for military construction and expansion. The end of the Cold War easily persuaded Congress to reduce the expensive military budgets of decades past. As a result, the government in 1990 began the process of closing or consolidating military operations and activities across the country as part of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC). As part of this trend, a number of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Training Centers were closed. New, permanent Marine Corps construction received little support as a result. Currently, the Marine Corps is in the process of reshaping and streamlining its reserve resources, especially with regards to recent international conflicts. While funding for reserve construction activities has been reduced in the past decade, the role of the Marine Corps Reserve will no doubt remain a vital one.

## CONCLUSION

Even though facing nearly 50 years of cyclical funding, difficult economic climates, and changeable public support the Marine Corps Reserves managed to build and consolidate a nationwide network of training facilities. Despite these limitations, MARFORRES maintains a nationwide network of training centers—begun in the immediate postwar years and continually updated—that serves to fulfill their mission of military preparedness.

# SUMMARY OF PROPERTY TYPES

The following is a brief summary of building types that, although geographically dispersed with different construction dates, share many common features related to their utilitarian use in fulfilling a specialized mission. Properties are organized into two primary classifications, Military-Related Properties and Non-Military-Related Properties, and into specific property categories within each classification.

## GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Post-World War II plans envisioned a network of reserve centers spread throughout the United States. Considerations for center locations included transportation access and population densities and large acreages for storage of large motor transport vehicles as well as for training exercises. Generally located away from the more expensive commercial and residential areas, most urban centers are located in the outskirts of town near existing military facilities or industrial complexes.

Plan configuration and site development vary by time period. Large land plots (greater than five acres) characterized the 1950s era, and in the 1960s plots became even more expansive with the growing trend to house tanks, amphibious vehicles, and transport vehicles on site. This trend continues today.

# MILITARY-RELATED PROPERTIES

### RESERVE TRAINING BUILDINGS

Reserve Training Buildings predominantly encompass the greatest amount of square footage and are typically located in the most prominent and visible location on the site. Housing mostly classrooms and administrative spaces, some larger examples contain assembly or drill halls, small arms ranges, and armories. The Marine Corps Reserves' long-term building program produced buildings that can be loosely grouped into distinctive evolutionary time periods. Alterations to older buildings (often as part of the Whole Center Repair program) typically include window and door replacements, wing additions on former Naval and Marine Corps centers to accommodate Marine Corps tenants and occasionally the application of new exterior finishes. Common trends for the last 50 years include:

 Immediately after World War II, buildings on military installations or private industry that had been part of the massive build-up for the war effort were repurposed for alternative military and civilian uses. A few centers, such as MCRC Wilmington, NC, were established in such excessed buildings. MCRC Wilmington occupies the former apprentice dormitories for the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company that expanded rapidly during World War II.

- From 1954 to 1963 centers featured permanent construction in a non-standardized, yet utilitarian, manner. Centers designed as stand-alone MCRCs were typically one-story masonry or brick veneer buildings. As part of another trend that is represented by MCRCs in this study, Marine Corps units were often incorporated into Naval Reserve centers and frequently resulted in the addition of a new wing to an existing building. As in the case of MCRC Folsom and MCRC Bakersfield, the Marine Corps Reserves would inherit the building when the Navy moved out.
- From 1964 to 1979, with a change in military spending, modesty in size and scope of the building projects prevailed. Centers were built in the International style that dominated architecture from the 1960s to the 1970s. The Marine Corps Reserves often co-located with other service branches. For example, until recently, MCRC Yakima also housed the local National Guard unit.

### SECONDARY TRAINING BUILDINGS

Secondary training buildings serve a support role as additional training space. Some have a specific function, such as parachute training buildings, maintenance shops, or administrative buildings, while others have the general designation of training and instruction buildings. Typically smaller than their corresponding reserve training buildings (RTBs), secondary training buildings vary widely in function according to tenant and design. At MCRC Folsom, PA, the secondary training building became the main RTB after demolition and renovation at the site. Common alterations are vinyl or aluminum siding additions.

### GARAGES AND VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

Garages and vehicle maintenance facilities (VMFs) typically function in Marine Corps operations to provide vehicle maintenance training. This property type includes buildings with vehicle maintenance facilities, separate garages, and open-air vehicle storage areas. These facilities are the second most common type of building at reserve centers and are auxiliary to a center's operation. Common alterations include enclosure of service bays or windows, pierced exterior walls for additional bay doors, and application of stucco or drivet over exterior wall surfaces.

#### SMALL ARMS RANGES AND ARMORIES

Small arms ranges are associated with Marine Corps reservists. Sometimes the ranges were incorporated into the main RTB. The buildings provided an indoor firing range for small arms and rifle qualification training. Lead from ammunition has proven environmentally unsafe, and most examples have been altered for storage, recreation, or other uses. Armories are often add-ons to the RTB and have interior access only.

#### STORAGE BUILDINGS

Storage buildings are common building types at reserve centers that have a supportive function. Uses include storage of hazardous or flammable materials, paint, or even ammunition. Often they display sympathetic materials and design to the RTB if original to the Center's complex.

### LOADING RAMPS AND VEHICLE WASH/GREASE RACKS

Loading ramps typically consist of a solid concrete ramp with low railings; most feature two levels for loading different sized vehicles. Vehicle maintenance structures are open-air and often have metal roofing supported by metal poles. The vehicle wash and grease racks tend to have more modern dates of construction, with a majority being built during the 1990s.

#### PLAYING FIELDS/OBSTACLE COURSES

Baseball diamonds, volleyball courts, and obstacle courses are found at many reserve centers. Ball diamonds typically have a portion of the developed acreage reserved for a playing field. A backstop of chain-link fencing and equipment storage lockers are often present. Volleyball courts are generally excavated and filled with sand. They might be outlined with brick. Obstacle courses are typically made from rough finished lumber and roping and tend to have a linear form.

## NON-MILITARY-RELATED PROPERTIES

#### PREVIOUSLY EXISTING BUILDINGS

Leasing or buying appropriate existing buildings for the use as training space has been a practical and economical alternative to constructing new reserve centers. While they typically share the institutional quality of military construction, pre-existing facilities feature physical characteristics and associative qualities that differ from Marine Corps-sponsored construction and even from buildings constructed by other branches of the military. MCRC Brook Park was a former elementary school, which was adapted to meet the training needs of Marine Corps Reservists. Typical alterations include replacement, covering over, or enclosure of original windows; replacement of original doors, roof repairs, and repainting of exterior walls.

## HISTORIC RESOURCES SURVEY

As a part of this historic resources study, 21 MCRCs were documented to provide an architectural description and history and, subsequently, a NRHP assessment. Methodology for documenting the built environment at all centers was similar and follows below.

### HISTORIC RESOURCES RESEARCH METHODS

### **REVIEW FILES AT MARFORRES HEADQUARTERS**

Project historians examined materials on file at the MARFORRES Headquarters (HQ) at Naval Support Activity in New Orleans, LA. The HQ real estate and facilities offices maintain files documenting construction projects, real property records, and construction plans. Review of these files began with one visit in June 2003 and concluded on a second visit in August 2003.

The HQ files contain a variety of materials, including site and architectural plans, which help document the physical and historical changes at the reserve centers. The Basic Facilities Planning Information (BFPI) report includes information documenting changes to buildings and structures at each center. Each activity is required to complete a BFPI record every two years or within 90 days following the completion of a major change to the facility. Many of these reports were on file at the HQ and were copied for reference. In addition, older Class 2 Property Records were found on file at the HQ. Current Class 2 Property Records are maintained by Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) and available through Navy Property records personnel. The property records indicate how the Marine Corps Reserves acquired a building, how much it cost, how interior spaces are used, and other detailed information regarding the building's physical characteristics. Project personnel secured a complete set of Class 2 Property Records for all MCRCs from personnel at NAVFAC Engineering Field Division South (EFD SOUTH).

While plans of some kind were available for all centers, original plans were rarely found. Most often, plans for recent renovations were readily available. Organizational changes within the Navy and Marine Corps Facilities programs and the transfer of responsibility for facilities from the Navy to the Marine Corps Reserves over the last three decades have resulted in an incomplete record of building plans and records of alterations to the built environment at several MCRC locations.

## **REVIEW FILES AT MCRCS**

Project architectural historians visited all the MCRCs to perform the historic resources survey. Prior to traveling to the reserve centers, the project manager contacted the inspector-instructor regarding the pending trip and inquired about

the availability of selected files and materials for examination by the historians. The inspector-instructors made facility files, architectural blueprints, command histories, scrapbooks, and other materials that documented the physical and historical development of their respective center available. The amount of material varied widely among the reserve centers. When available, the historians copied leases/deeds, current site plans, and details of architectural drawings for original construction or remodeling projects. Many of the reserve centers maintained scrapbooks with old photographs, letters, commendations and awards, newspaper clippings, and press notices that shed light on the history of the MCRCs.

While at the reserve centers, the project historians examined the buildings, structures, and objects noting salient physical features on survey forms created for the project. The architectural historian then photographed the buildings, structures, and objects using a digital camera. After returning from the field, project personnel encoded field and historical data into a project-specific database to access and manipulate information on the reserve centers. *Appendix A* contains the database printouts for major buildings at MCRC Wilmington.

### **OTHER REPOSITORIES**

Project historians also consulted local repositories and public offices to obtain additional information about the MCRC buildings or the history of the reserve center and reservists. Typically, researchers visited the local library and consulted several informational sources including local history collections, archival collections, or newspaper files. In some locations, public offices such as the building inspector, city planning departments, or county courthouse were visited in search of construction information and real property information. These visits varied by location and by the kinds of information already on hand to the researcher.



MCRC WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA - UIC No.: M46047

### **PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION**

MCRC Wilmington (Figure 1) includes the RTB (Facility 1), combat vehicle maintenance shop (CVMS) (Facility 2), and flagpole (Facility 4), all sitting on a 3.02-acre site. MCRC Wilmington is located at 2150 Burnet Boulevard, in the southwest portion of Wilmington, North Carolina (Figure 2). Directly northeast of the center is housing that dates from the early 1900s to the 1960s, while the area to its south is dominated by industrial development. In addition to the permanent structures, MCRC Wilmington includes two, portable, steel, hazardous material storage containers (no facility numbers), paved parking lots flanking the RTB's north, west, and south façades, and a grass volleyball court. Landscaping consists of clipped lawns and variously aged hardwood trees and shrubs with a small grassy front lawn located directly east of the RTB. A six-foot high, chain-link and barbed-wire security fence encloses the entire complex (Figure 3).

Figure 1. MCRC Wilmington, 2003.





Figure 2. Location map of MCRC Wilmington.



MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTER WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA

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Figure 3. Site Plan of MCRC Wilmington.

### HISTORIC RESOURCES SURVEY

The RTB is an irregular-plan, 17,115 square-foot structure that the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company erected as a dormitory in 1941. The wood-frame building is composed of a two-story, hipped-roof central mass with rear, one-story hipped- and gabled-roof wings. Louvered wood cupolas, located atop the facility's roof, provide ventilation for its attic space, while metal gutters and downspouts, mounted on the building's east, west, and south façades carry water from the roof's exterior surface. The original hipped-roof portion of the building has a pier-and-beam foundation, while the rear gabled- and hipped-roof additions rest atop concrete slabs. The facility's exterior walls are clad primarily with horizontal vinyl siding. Additional exterior wall cladding includes concrete block and brick, which is on the building's west façade attached boiler room and its foundation skirting. Louvered metal grates punctuate the building foundation skirting at regular intervals. As a result of a recent whole center renovation. the building's original wood-sash, double-hung windows have been replaced with the current one-over-one, single-hung, aluminum-frame units. The building's primary (east) facade displays three sets of paired, metal and glass storefront doors, each with a gabledroof entry porch. A three-step concrete stoop leads to each entry. Secondary entries, located on the building's west facade, include paired and single, hollow, metal doors.

The facility's first floor interior space consists of a central corridor flanked on either side by administrative offices, while the second floor contains bathrooms, a laundry room, and a conference room. Interior finishes include vinyl tile flooring, and painted gypsum board and plywood paneling with unfinished wood moldings and chair rails. Acoustic tile and plywood panel ceilings with mounted fluorescent lighting and wood doors are used throughout.

The CVMS (Facility 2) erected in 1985, is a one-story, load-bearing masonry that is situated northwest of the RTB (*Figure 4*). The rectangular-plan building has concrete-block exterior walls and a composition shingle, gable-on-hip roof. The resource rests atop a concrete, slab-on-grade foundation. Exterior entrances include hinged single and overhead sectional metal doors, and windows are single-hung, aluminum-sash units. The building's 2,141 square-foot interior space is composed of a large two-bay maintenance area that is flanked by three storage rooms, a bathroom, and a dispatcher's office.



Figure 4. CVMS, MCRC Wilmington, 2003.

### HISTORIC BACKGROUND

With the onset of war in Europe, the U.S. Maritime Commission identified an immediate need to increase the size of the British and U.S. Merchant Marines fleets in 1939. In order to meet this need the commission, beginning in 1940, initiated the construction of 18 temporary cargo shipbuilding facilities. Although the commission retained ownership of the buildings and land associated with each shipvard, privately owned shipbuilding companies leased and operated each facility (Watson 1992). The North Carolina Shipbuilding Company, a subsidiary of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, established one such facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1941 soon after it entered into an agreement with the U.S. Maritime Commission to produce 25 EC2-S-C1 or "Liberty" cargo ships by 1943. Although only a cargo ship, the Liberty was considered crucial to the nation's shipbuilding program because it provided the means to support a steady supply of goods and material to troops stationed abroad. Initial construction at the shipyard began 3 February 1941, and by December 6 of that same year, only a few hours prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the yard launched its first Liberty ship. Facility 1, the building that currently functions as the RTB at MCRC Wilmington, was erected in this initial phase of construction at the shipyard and originally served as the yard's apprentice dormitory (Figures 5 and 6).

In January 1942, soon after the United States formally entered into World War II, the shipyard's role increased dramatically when the government awarded the shipyard a second contract to produce 53 more Liberty ships. In 1943, the company ceased

production of the Liberty cargo ship and began production of the more powerful, technologically advanced C-2 Victory ship. This shift necessitated a number of changes and new construction at the yard.




Figure 5. Shipyards apprentice dormitory, ca. 1941 (Source: North Carolina Shipbuilding Company).




Figure 6. Elevation of the shipyards apprentice dormitory, 1941 (Source: North Carolina State Port Authority files).

One such change was that the building that originally functioned as the yard's apprentice dormitory underwent an interior alteration in 1944 to convert it to an employment office. By the time the company ceased production in 1946, the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company Shipyard had produced 243 Liberty and C-2 Victory ships. At its peak, the

shipyard provided employment for nearly 25,000 residents of New Hanover County and contributed approximately \$50 million to the local economy annually (North Carolina Shipbuilding Company 1946).

Although Wilmington residents lobbied for the establishment of a drydock facility in the abandoned shipyard, the Maritime Commission designated the property a "reserve yard" or a "graveyard" for retired ships (Watson 1992, 155). In 1949, the North Carolina State Ports Authority leased a portion of the shipyard from the commission and in 1956 acquired ownership of the property. Five years later, the Maritime Commission leased the shipyard's remaining 115 acres to the Ports Authority. In 1971, a year after the yard's last mothballed ship was scrapped, the North Carolina State Ports Authority finally purchased this remaining acreage, therefore acquiring ownership of the entire former shipyard (Ippolito 1992).

By the 1980s, the Marine Corps Reserve program shifted from building new Reserve centers to acquiring and renovating existing structures according to their needs. In keeping with this trend, the Marine Corps Reserves, in 1984, established one of its North Carolina Reserve training centers within the building that originally functioned as the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company's apprentice dormitory. When the Reserves moved into the building, the aging facility needed modernization. The Marine Corps Reserves therefore undertook a whole center renovation from 1984 to 1985 to upgrade the then 44-year-old facility. Alterations included the addition of vinyl siding to the building's exterior walls, the replacement of original windows, and interior renovation. In addition, a rear equipment room was demolished and replaced with a gabled-roof, concrete-block wing that currently functions as the center's armory. Finally, Facility 2, a CVMS, and Facility 4, a flagpole, were erected during this period. In 1988, the U.S. Navy officially purchased the building from the North Carolina Shipbuilding Company Shipyard from the North Carolina Maritime Authority for \$15,646. The unit that currently occupies the facility, the Detachment 1 Beach Terminal Operations Company Force LSB, 4<sup>th</sup> Force Service Support Group, has the primary mission of providing logistical support to deployed forces, including offloading and loading ships, aircraft, and railcars.

### NRHP ASSESSMENT

Originally erected in 1941 as a dormitory for the former North Carolina Shipbuilding Company Shipyard, the RTB at MCRC Wilmington meets the 50-year age requirement typically recommended for NRHP consideration. Although it was not originally a DODowned operation, the shipyard was built to Federal standards with Federal monies and functioned as a government-owned, contractor-operated facility. During the World War II era, the Federal government established numerous war-related plants and manufacturing facilities throughout the United States. Building specifications typically limited masonry construction to only the most important buildings to expedite the construction process and conserve resources. Consequently, the vast majority of buildings erected to fulfill

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short-term, war-related needs during this period, utilized wood-frame construction because they were never intended to last much beyond the duration of the war. Although the life expectancy of these buildings was short, limited funding for new construction often forced the military to continue to use these temporary buildings after World War II and far beyond their intended life span. Such was the case of the Wilmington RTB, a wood-frame building, constructed from Federal funds during the World War II era. The temporary nature of the building's construction is evident from the original architectural drawings which do not list a designer and almost appear as interim construction documents. It is a utilitarian structure with only minimal amounts of stylistic detailing and embellishment and lacks any noteworthy design or architectural features.

Despite the fact that the building lacks architectural significance and is defined as a temporary World War II building, it is strongly associated with important historical trends and is significant at the local level for its associations with these patterns. The shipyard itself is noteworthy because of its considerable impact on Hanover County's World War II-era economy and its many contributions to the overall growth of Wilmington during this period. The Wilmington RTB provides a tangible link to this chapter in local history and represents the shipyard's operations and its contributions to the war effort. At a national level, the shipyard was one of only 18 facilities that produced both Liberty and C-2 Victory ships, two shipbuilding programs that contributed significantly to the World War II effort. Although the building's architectural integrity has diminished somewhat by the replacement of its original windows, doors, and exterior wall cladding, it still retains its original roof form, fenestration pattern, and overall form and remains recognizable to its period of significance. Because the Wilmington RTB is one of the few remaining architecturally intact buildings associated with the shipyard, it is eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criterion A.

### NRHP MITIGATION

Although it meets NRHP Criterion A and is eligible for inclusion in the NRHP, the RTB is a World War II temporary building and is subject to a Programmatic Memorandum of Agreement (PMOA) signed by DOD, the National Council of Historic Preservation Officers (NCHPO), and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP). Impetus for the PMOA, which was signed in 1993, resulted from Congress' desire to allocate and spend Federal funds in a cost-effective manner. Realizing that the disproportionate amount of money required for the upkeep, maintenance, and repair of temporary buildings constructed in support of the World War II effort was not an effective use of public monies, DOD developed the PMOA to comply with Congress' intentions and worked with NCHPO and ACHP to develop mitigative measures for federally assisted projects that have the potential to affect any World War II temporary buildings that are eligible for the NRHP. Because it meets the criteria for classification as a World War II temporary building, Building 1 has been mitigated in compliance with the nationwide PMOA and is no longer subject to Section 106 coordination in the event that any federally sponsored actions affect the building.

# NRHP RECOMMENDATIONS

MCRC Wilmington is considered eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criterion A. This report complies with Section 110 of the NHPA. Section 106 requires Federal agencies to take into account the effects of their activities and programs on historic properties. However, since MCRC Wilmington meets the criteria for classification as a World War II temporary building, Building 1 has been mitigated in compliance with the nationwide PMOA covering World War II temporary buildings and is no longer subject to Section 106 coordination in the event that any federally sponsored actions affect the building.

This report should be forwarded by registered mail to SHPO (address below) and should be coordinated with MARFORRES HQ, Environmental Division. The activity and the HQ should keep copies of all correspondence with SHPO and incorporate the correspondence into the report. SHPO, upon receipt of the report, has 30 days to review and provide comments. If SHPO concurs with the report's evaluation of MCRC Wilmington, Section 106 coordination will be necessary should MARFORRES engage in any undertakings that would affect the property, such as major renovations or closure of the facility.

SHPO contact information:

Dr. Jeffrey J. Crow SHPO Division of Archives & History 4610 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-4610 Phone: (919) 733-7305 Fax: (919) 733-8807 Email: jeffrey.crow@ncmailnet

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## LIST OF PREPARERS

David W. Moore, Jr.Bachelor of Arts degree in History from the University of Texas at<br/>Austin in 1977. Mr. Moore has 24 years of experience in historic<br/>preservation and cultural resources management. He meets the<br/>Secretary of the Interior's Professional Qualification Standards as a<br/>historian. Mr. Moore supervised the project's completion.

- Anna I. MadronaBachelor of Science in Natural Resources Management from the<br/>University of Nebraska at Lincoln in 1978 and Master of Arts in<br/>History from the University of Tennessee in 1991. Ms. Madrona has<br/>20 years of experience in natural and cultural resources management.<br/>She meets the Secretary of the Interior's Professional Qualification<br/>Standards as a historian. Ms. Madrona served as project manager for<br/>the report's completion. She also conducted on-site documentation<br/>and research at several of the sites and completed histories for them.
- Karen HughesBachelor of Applied Arts in Interior Design from RyersonArchitecturalPolytechnic University in Toronto in 1998 and Master of BuildingHistorianConservation from the University of York, England in 2000. Ms.Hughes meets the Secretary of the Interior's Professional<br/>Qualification Standards as an architectural historian, and has five<br/>years of experience in cultural resources management and building<br/>conservation. Ms. Hughes conducted on-site documentation,<br/>architectural, and historical research at several of the sites.

Olivia Fagerberg Architectural Historian Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology and Classical Studies from Vassar College in 1996 and a Master of Science in Architectural Studies from the University of Texas at Austin in 2002. Ms. Fagerberg meets the Secretary of the Interior's Professional Qualification Standards as an architectural historian and has two years of experience in architectural research and writing. Ms. Fagerberg conducted on-site documentation and research at several MARFORRES sites and completed the written history and analysis for each.

Jennifer Ross Architectural Historian Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology from the Southern Illinois University in 1995 and a Master of Science in Architecture from Texas Tech University in 2003. Ms. Ross meets the Secretary of the Interior's Professional Qualification Standards as an architectural historian and has five years of experience in cultural resources management and building documentation. Ms. Ross conducted onsite documentation and research at several of the sites and completed the written history and analysis for each.

Kristian Key Architectural Historian	Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Texas Tech University in 1999 and a candidate for Masters of Architectural Preservation at the same university. Mr. Key has worked on HAER documentation with the NPS. He wrote architectural descriptions, produced the building inventory database, and assisted in the organization of historic resources reports.
Lisa E. Worley <i>Historian</i>	Bachelor of Arts in History from the University of Arizona in 1996 and a Master of Arts in Public History, emphasis in Historic Preservation, from Colorado State University in 1998. Ms. Worley has seven years of experience in the museum field. She meets the Secretary of the Interior's Professional Qualification Standards as a historian. Ms. Worley conducted on-site documentation and research at several of the sites. She ensured the report's completion.
Jan Root <i>Historian</i>	Bachelor of Arts in History from the University of Texas at Austin in 1984. Ms. Root has 18 years of experience in curatorial and archival management. She meets the Secretary of the Interior's Professional Qualification Standards as a historian. Ms. Root undertook historic research and completed written histories for various sites.

# **OTHER CONTRIBUTORS:**

Lori Smith – Editor and Production Manager Holly Prather – Graphic Designer William Cody – Cartographer Sara Sabzevari – Research and Production Assistant Jo Beth Jones – Production Assistant

# Marine Forces Reserve Cultural Resources Survey (FY 2003-04) - Inventory of Major Facilities





FY 2003-04 NRHP Recommendation Does not meet NRHP criteria; Not eligible for NRHP

Building No.	2	
Property Record	260732	
Name	Vehicle Maintenance Facility	
Date	1985 Altered	
Current Use	Combat Vehicle Maintenance	
Historic Use	Combat Vehicle Maintenance	
Architect:	Unknown	
Contractor:	Unknown	
Property Type	Military-related	
Subtype	vehicle maintenance	
No. of Stories	2	
Plan	rectangular	
Dimensions	<i>l</i> : 51 ft w: 37 ft h: 20 ft	
Foundation Type	slab on grade	
Structural System	load-bearing masonry	
Roof	gable-on-hip	
Exterior Materials	concrete block	
Primary Door	overhead sectional single	
<b>Door Materials</b>	steel	
Primary Window	single-hung	
Window Materials	aluminum	